We discuss a quantum network, in which the sender has m0 outgoing channels, the receiver has m0 incoming channels, each channel is of capacity d, each intermediate node applies invertible unitary, only m1 channels are corrupted, and other non-corrupted channels are noiseless. As our result, we show that the quantum capacity is not smaller than (m0 − 2m1 + 1) log d under the following two settings. In the first case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are arbitrary and the corruptions on the m1 channels are individual. In the second case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are restricted to Clifford operations and the corruptions on the m1 channels are adaptive, i.e., the attacker is allowed to have a quantum memory. Further, our code in the second case realizes the noiseless communication even with the single-shot setting and is constructed dependently only on the network topology and the places of the m1 corrupted channels while this result holds regardless of the network topology and the places.
When two distant players communicate their quantum states via a single channel, their communication can be disturbed by the corruption of the channel. In the classical information theory, to resolve this problem, they employ information transmission over a network, which is composed of nodes and channels [1] [2] [3] . Combining a network code, they realized a reliable communication even when a part of nodes are corrupted because a network code realizes the diversification of risk. Many existing papers for the quantum network addressed the multipleunicast network [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The coding scheme proposed in [5] was already implemented experimentally [14] . However, they did not discuss a reliable quantum network code over corruptions on the quantum network even in the unicast network. Since a corruption on a node can be propagated to the entire network due to the network structure, it is desired to discuss a reliable quantum network code for the unicast network even in the presence of the corruption. Indeed, while the preceding paper [15] constructed such a network code, it did not discuss the optimality of the transmission rate. Also, the code constructed in [15] works only when the unitary operations on the network nodes belong to a limited class. This paper discusses the quantum capacity of a partially corrupted quantum unicast network, i.e., the optimal value of the reliable transmission rate under the knowledge of the form of the corruption for a more general class of node operations on the network. Our problem setting is slightly different from those of the preceding papers [13, 15] because [13, 15] discussed quantum * masahito@math.nagoya-u.ac.jp † m17021a@math.nagoya-u.ac.jp network coding under limited knowledge of the corruption. Whereas conventional network coding considers the optimization of node operations given a directed graph of the network, we consider the quantum capacity when node operations are given as well because it is often quite difficult to control node operations. Specifically, we address the worst-case capacity among a certain condition, which is formulated as follows. Every quantum channel transmits a d-dimensional system by one use of the network. The sender has m 0 outgoing quantum channels. Each intermediate node has the same number of incoming quantum channels and outgoing quantum channels. The node applies a fixed unitary across the incoming quantum systems and outputs them to the outgoing quantum channels. Finally, the receiver receives m 0 quantum systems via m 0 incoming quantum channels. We assume that only m 1 quantum channels are corrupted at most. Other channels are assumed to be noiseless in the same way as secure classical network coding [1] [2] [3] because the errors of these normal channels can be corrected by quantum error correcting code. Also, the network is assumed to have no cycle and to be well synchronized, i.e., to have no delayed transmission. Only the sender and the receiver are allowed to optimize their coding operation due to the difficulty of node operation control. Although the paper [15] assumed that the sender and the receiver do not know the places of corrupted channels, the places are assumed to be known to them in our setting.
There are two types of quantum settings. The first one is the individual corruption, in which the corruption on each corrupted quantum channel is done individually. The other is the adaptive corruption, in which the corruptions on respective corrupted quantum channels are done adaptively. That is, the attacker has a quantum memory, and the quantum memory interacts the corrupted quantum channel on each corruption. For an adversar-ial corruption, we need to consider such a malicious case. This kind of corruption can be written by quantum comb [16, 17] . The adaptive setting is more general than the individual setting, and the adaptive setting often cannot be reduced to the individual setting in general. For example, adaptive strategies cannot be reduced to individual strategies quantum channel discrimination [18] .
In the classical case of this setting, we can show that the capacity, i.e., the maximum transmission rate is not smaller than (m 0 −m 1 ) log d. In contrast, when our quantum channel has only individual corruptions, we find that the quantum capacity, i.e., the maximum transmission rate of the quantum state is not smaller than (m 0 − 2m 1 + 1) log d. This fact is shown by the analysis of coherent information on the quantum network. Further, when the unitaries on our network are limited to Clifford operations, the quantum capacity is not smaller than (m 0 − 2m 1 + 1) log d even when the corruptions are adaptive. In this case, our code can be constructed in the single-shot setting by using Clifford operations. This construction depends only on the applied Clifford operations and the places of the corrupted channels, and is independent of Eve's operation to the corrupted channels. This phenomena can be intuitively explained for the case of Clifford operations as follows. The sender can identify the place of the first corruption. However, at the other corruptions, the corrupted computation bases and the corrupted Fourier bases split in general. For this characterization, the behavior of the error is described by the the symplectic structure. In particular, the symplectic diagonalization plays an essential role in the code construction. Hence, in the worst case, totally 2m 1 − 1 quantum systems are corrupted.
II. CLASSICAL NETWORK MODEL
When all the node operations are invertible linear on a finite field of order q (= d), the receiver can find a linear subspace for corrupted information, as discussed in [2] . The dimension of the subspace is bounded by m 1 . Hence, the capacity is not smaller than (m 0 − m 1 ) log d. However, when node operations are not necessarily linear but are invertible, we cannot apply the above discussion. Even in this case, we can show that the capacity is not smaller than (m 0 − m 1 ) log d as shown in Appendix A.
III. GENERAL UNITARY NETWORK MODEL
The general unitary network model is described as follows. In this model, we assume that the places of the channels to be corrupted are known. Since our network is composed of unitary operations and partial corruptions, our network model of the adaptive corruption is given as the general form with Fig. 1 , whose reason is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The input and output systems are the m 0 -tensor product system H ⊗m0 of the same system H of dimension d, and m 1 + 1 unitaries U = (U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U m1 ) are applied between the input and output systems, which has m 1 intervals. Eve can access only the first system on each interval, and has her memory so that the corruption in the i-th interval is given as the unitaryŨ i between her memory and the corrupted system, i.e., the first system on the i-th interval. Our first result is on the minimum capacity of the general unitary network with individual corruption, in which Eve is assumed to have no memory. Hence, her operation on the i-th interval can be written as TP-CP maps Γ = (Γ 1 , . . . , Γ m1 ) as Fig. 3 . In this case, the channel between the input and output systems is denoted by Λ(U , Γ). C(Λ) expresses the quantum capacity of a quantum channel Λ. One of our main results characterizes the quantum capacity under the individual corruption as follows.
Theorem 1. The minimum quantum capacity is given as follows.
Here, the minimum is taken over all channels Λ(U , Γ) under the individual corruption.
To show the theorem, we employ the coherent information I c (ρ, Λ) for an input state ρ and a quantum channel Λ with an output system A. By using the environment E of Λ, the coherent information I c (ρ, Λ) is written as H(A) − H(E), where H(A) and H(E) are the von Neumann entropy of the respective system when the input state is ρ [19] [20, (8.37) ]. It is known that the quantum capacity C(Λ) is given as the maximum
where the maximum is taken over all the input densities on the n-tensor system of the input system of Λ [21] [22] [23] [24] , [20, Theorem 9.10] .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix B. Due to the additivity property I c (ρ ⊗n , Λ ⊗n ) = nI c (ρ, Λ), the lemma and the above capacity formula (2) guarantee the inequality ≥ in (1). As shown later, Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of a channel Λ(U , Γ) to satisfy the equality, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. CLIFFORD NETWORK MODEL
To extend Theorem 1 to the adaptive corruption described in Fig. 1 , we introduce Clifford network model.
In this model, our code can achieve the capacity even with the single-shot setting. For this aim, we prepare several notations. Given a prime power q = p dq , our Hilbert space H is assumed to be spanned by the computational basis {|x } x∈Fq , where F q is the algebraic extension of the finite field F p with degree d q . That is, the dimension of the Hilbert space H is assumed to be q. Then, for s, t ∈ F q , we define the generalized Pauli operators X(s) and Z(t) as X(s) := x∈Fq |x + s x| and Z(t) := x∈Fq ω tr xt |x x|, where ω := e 2π √ −1/p . Here, for an element z ∈ F q , tr z expresses the element Tr M z ∈ F p , where M z denotes the matrix representation of the multiplication map x → zx with identifying the finite field F q with the vector space F dq p . We define the Fourier basis {|y F ∈ H} y∈Fq of the computational basis {|x } x∈Fq ∈ H as
To consider our network model, for vectors s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ F n q , we define the operators X(s) and Z(t) on the n-fold tensor product system
holds, and a square matrix g on F 2n q is called a symplectic matrix when (s, t),
q . Next, we introduce Clifford group as a subset of the set U(H ⊗n ) of unitaries on H ⊗n . Using the set W := {cW(s, t)} |c|=1,(s,t)∈F 2n q , we define the Clifford group C as C :
For any element U ∈ C, there exists a symplectic matrix g such that
for (s, t) ∈ F 2n q with a complex number c satisfying |c| = 1. Conversely, for any symplectic matrix g, there exists a unitary U to satisfy (5) . A typical construction of such a unitary U is given in [20, Section 8.3 ]. This construction is called metaplectic representation and is denoted by U (g) in this paper. Now, the input and output systems are assumed to be H ⊗m0 , and the unitary U i is to be an element of Clifford group. Such a network is called Clifford network. We choose a symplectic matrix g i as U (g i ) = U i . Theorem 2. For Clifford network, the minimum quantum capacity is (m 0 − 2m 1 + 1) log q in the adaptive corruption, i.e., the case when Eve has a memory to perform adaptive attacks.
To show Theorem 2, we describe the behaviors of the errors in the terms of the symplectic structure. That is, the errors can be described by vectors in F 2m0 q . For this aim, we introduce notations and parameters of the network as follows. Let e i be the vector in F 2m0 q that has only one nonzero element 1 in the i-th entry. Using e 1 and e m0+1 , we define 2m
Since e 1 and e m0+1 describe the directions of errors in the respective interval, all the directions in the linear space V spanned by v 1 , . . . , v 2m1 are corrupted in this whole network. However, since the direction v i is corrupted, the direction Jv i is also corrupted. Therefore, the set of all corrupted directions is given by V + JV.
In this paper, when a matrix P satisfies P 2 = P and ImP = V, it is called a projection onto V. Then, we choose a projection
With these observations, we define the integers m * and m * * as m
i,j=1 is at least 2. As the rank of ( v i , Jv j ) 2m1 i,j=1 equals the rank of P ⊤ V JP V , the inequality
So, since 2m 1 ≥ m * * + m * , we have
The quantum capacity C is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2. The capacity C is lower bounded as C ≥ (m 0 − m * * ) log q in the adaptive case, i.e., the case when Eve has a memory to perform her attack.
It is a key point for the construction of a code achieving the rate (m 0 − m * * ) log q to avoid the space V + JV from the encoded space. As shown in Appendix D, we can choose 2m 0 independent vectors w 1 , . . . , w m0 and w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ m0 satisfying the following conditions. (i)
. . , w m0 and w ′ m0−m * * , . . . , w ′ m0 . The condition (i) enables us to choose a symplectic matrix g * such that g * e i = w i and g * e m0+i = w ′ i for i = 1, . . . , m 0 because the vectors w i and w ′ i with i = 1, . . . , m 0 have the same symplectic structure as the vectors e 1 , . . . , e 2m0 .
Then, we define the encoding unitary U e := U (g * ) and the decoding unitary U d := U (g * ) −1 U −1 0 · · · U −1 m1 . The message space is set to H ⊗m0−m * * . The encoder is given as follows. We fix an arbitrary density ρ 0 on H ⊗m * * . For any input density ρ i on H ⊗m0−m * * , the encoder is given as
where Tr m * * is the partial trace with respect to the system H ⊗m * * .
To analyze this code, we remind the following facts. First, the set of all corrupted directions is given by V + JV. Second, the information on the computational basis and the information on the Fourier basis are decoded perfectly, if and only if the transmitted quantum state is decoded perfectly [25] , [20, Section 8.15] . It is clear from the first fact and the construction of U e and U d that the information on the computation basis and the information on the Fourier basis is decoded perfectly even when Eve makes an adaptive corruption. Therefore, even for any adaptive corruption, the pair of the above encoder and the above decoder can decode the original state ρ i on H ⊗m0−m * . This discussion shows Lemma 2. Our code construction depends only on g 0 , . . . , g m1 . That is, it is independent of the remaining unitariesŨ 1 , . . . ,Ũ m1 of Eve's corruption. The tightness of the evaluation in Lemma 2 is guaranteed as follows. Lemma 3 is shown in Appendix C. In this way, the capacity is characterized by rank P ⊤ V JP V and dim V. The following lemma clarifies the possible range of these two numbers.
Lemma 4. The following conditions are equivalent for two integers l * and l * * .
(1): 2m 1 − 1 ≥ l * * ≥ l * ≥ 1 and m 0 ≥ l * * .
(2): There exists a sequence of Clifford unitaries U (g 0 ), . . . , U (g m1 ) such that 2l * = rank P ⊤ V JP V and l * + l * * = dim V.
The relation (2)⇒(1) is shown as follows. The inequality l * * ≥ l * follows from (7) , and the inequality l * ≥ 1 follows from (6) . Since rank P ⊤ V JP V = 2l * , there exist l * * independent vectors x 1 , . . . , x l * * ∈ V such that x j , Jx i = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . l * * . Since the number of such vectors is upper bounded by m 0 , we have m 0 ≥ l * * . The relation 2m 1 − 1 ≥ l * * follows from (8) . The opposite direction (1)⇒(2) will be shown later by using after Lemma 5. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 imply that the worst quantum capacity is (m 0 − 2m 1 + 1) log q, which shows Theorem 2.
V. BASIS-LINEAR NETWORK MODEL
To construct a concrete network model to satisfy Condition (2) given in Lemma 4, we consider a special class of Clifford networks, called basis-linear networks. In basislinear networks, we assume that each Clifford unitary U i is characterized as the basis exchange caused by an invertible matrixḡ i on F m0 q , which is similar to the case of CSS (Calderbank-Shor-Steane) code [26, 27] . That is, the Clifford unitary U i is given as the unitaryŪ (ḡ i ) defined byŪ (ḡ)|x = |ḡx . Its action on the Fourier basis
Letē i be the vector in F m0 q that has only one nonzero element 1 in the i-th entry. By using the vectorē 1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F m0 q , the vectors v 1 , . . . , v 2m1 are writ-
Lemma 5. The following conditions are equivalent for three integers l 1 , l 2 , and l 3 .
(2): There exists a sequence of invertible matrices g 0 , . . . ,ḡ m1 over finite field F q such that rankV = l 1 , rankV ′ = l 2 , and rank(V ′ ) ⊤V = l 3 .
Lemma 5 is shown in Appendix E with the concrete construction of a basis-linear network to satisfy Condition (2) in Lemma 5.
When Condition (1) of Lemma 4 holds, Condition (1) of Lemma 5 holds with the condition l * = l 3 and l * * = l 1 + l 2 − l 3 . Since Condition (2) in Lemma 5 implies Condition (2) of Lemma 4 with this condition, we obtain the direction (1)⇒(2) in Lemma 4, which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have shown that the quantum capacity is not smaller than (m 0 −2m 1 +1) log d when the sender has m 0 outgoing channels, the receiver has m 0 incoming channels, each intermediate node applies invertible unitary, only m 1 channels are corrupted in our quantum network model, and other non-corrupted channels are noiseless. Our result holds with the following two cases. In the first case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are arbitrary and the corruptions on the m 1 channels are individual. In the second case, the unitaries on intermediate nodes are restricted to Clifford operations and the corruptions on the m 1 channels are adaptive, i.e., the attacker is allowed to have a quantum memory. Further, our code in the second case realizes the noiseless communication even with the single-shot setting, and depends only on the node operations, the network topology, and the places of the m 1 corrupted channels. That is, it is independent of Eve's operation on the m 1 corrupted channels. This code utilizes the following structure of this model. The error in the first corrupted channel can be concentrated to one quantum system. However, the errors of the computation basis and the Fourier basis in another corrupted channel split to two quantum systems in general. Hence, 2m 1 − 1 quantum systems are corrupted in the worst case. As explained in Appendix, the first case has been shown by the analysis of the coherent information, and symplectic structure including symplectic diagonalization on the discrete system plays a key role in the second case. It is an interesting remaining problem to derive the quantum capacity when the operations on intermediate nodes are arbitrary unitaries and the corruptions on the m 1 channels are adaptive. 
APPENDIX
The appendix is organized as follows. Appendix A discusses the classical case. Appendix B proves Lemma 1. Appendix C proves Lemma 3. Appendix D gives the choice of vectors w 1 , . . . , w m0 and w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ m0 that are used in code to achieve the rate C ≥ (m 0 − m * * ) log q. Since it employs symplectic diagonalization, Appendix D 2 summarizes a fundamental knowledge of symplectic diagonalization. Appendix E proves Lemma 5.
Appendix A: Classical network model
We consider a classical network model as follows. Every channel transmits a system whose number of elements is d by one use of the network. The sender has m 0 outgoing channels. Node operations are not necessarily linear but are invertible. m 1 channels are corrupted. Hence, we can assume that m 1 corruptions are done sequentially. Let X ′ i−1 and X i be the whole information before and after the i-th corruption, respectively. Then, X ′ i is written as f i (X i ) by using an invertible function f i . Here, we denote the input and output information of this network by X 0 and X ′ m1 , respectively. Since the channel capacity of classical communication is given by the maximum mutual information between the input information and the output information, it is sufficient to show that
with a certain distribution P X0 of X 0 . Now, we set the distribution P X0 of X 0 to be the uniform distribution, which implies that
From the network structure, we find the relation
The chain rule of conditional entropy implies that
The combination of (A2) and (A3) yields (A1).
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
It is sufficient to show the case when U 0 is the identity matrix. Let ρ mix,m0−1 be the completely mixed state on H ⊗m0−1 . We set the initial state to be |0 0|⊗ρ mix,m0−1 .
Consider the time after the unitary U i−1 is applied but Γ i is not applied yet. At this time, we denote the system to be attacked and the remaining system by A i and B i , respectively. After the application of Γ i , we denote the system to be attacked and the remaining system by A ′ i and B ′ i , respectively. We consider Steinspring represen-tationŨ i of Γ i , in which the output of the environment is E i . Fig. 4 summarizes the relation among the systems
After the application of the unitary U i−1 , the operationŨ i is applied.
Since the state on A ′ 1 E 1 is pure, we have H(A ′ 1 ) = H(E 1 ). Hence, we have
As shown later, for i = 2, . . . , m 1 , we have
Combining (B1) and (B2), we have
Now, we show (B2). Consider the purification of ρ A ′ i Ei by using the reference system R. Then,
Thus,
Here, (a) follows from (B4), (b) follows from
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 3
To show Lemma 3, we prepare the following lemma, which will be shown in the end of this Appendix. Lemma 6. When a channel Λ A is entanglementbreaking, a channel Λ B satisfies the condition
For the preparation of Lemma 3, we define the notation for the generalized Pauli channel as follows. Given a distribution P on F 2l q , we define the channel Λ P as
Then, we denote the uniform distribution over F 2m q and the uniform distribution over the subset {(s, 0)} s∈F m q by P mix,m and P mixZ,m , respectively. Hence, the channels on the attacked edges are the Pauli channel Λ Pmix,1 .
We assume that the sender applies the encoding unitary U e before transmission and the receiver applies the decoding unitary U d after the reception. Considering the output behaviors on the computation basis and on the Fourier basis, we find that the channel from the sender to the receiver is given as Id m0−m * * ⊗ Λ Pmix,m * ⊗ Λ PmixZ,m * * −m * . Since P mixZ,m is the pinching channel with respect to the measurement on the Fourier basis, we find that the channel Λ Pmix,m * ⊗ Λ PmixZ,m * * −m * is entanglement-breaking.
Since the channel Λ Pmix,m * ⊗ Λ PmixZ,m * * −m * is entanglement-breaking, Lemma 6 guarantees that
where I c (ρ, Λ) is the coherent information.
Since the maximum transmission rate is upper bounded by the maximum coherent information, we obtain the converse part.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Let A and B (A ′ and B ′ ) be the input (output) systems of Λ A and Λ B , respectively. We choose a state ρ AB on AB. Let C be the reference system of the state ρ AB so that ρ ABC is the purification of ρ AB . Let ρ ′ be the output system on the whole system of A ′ , B ′ and C.
Since Λ A is entanglement-breaking, it is written
where {M a } is a POVM and rank M a = 1. Hence, Λ A (ρ ABC ) is written as a P A ′ =a ρ BC|A ′ =a ⊗ ρ A ′ =a , where P A ′ =a := Tr M a ρ A and ρ BC|A ′ =a := Tr A M a ρ ABC /P A ′ =a . Hence, rank ρ BC|A ′ =a = 1.
Then, we denote
, which is evaluated as
The inequality follows from the information processing inequality for the map |a a| → ρ A ′ =a . Since rank ρ BC|A ′ =a = 1, ρ BC|A ′ =a is a purification of
. Hence, we have
which implies that
Next, we show the converse inequality
For any state τ on the system B, define ρ AB = ρ A ⊗ τ where ρ A is a pure state. Then, we have
Therefore, we obtain (C7). Now, we choose we can choose 2m 0 independent vectors w 1 , . . . , w m0 and w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ m0 satisfying the following conditions. (i) w ′ i , Jw j = δ i,j and w i , Jw j = w ′ i , Jw ′ j = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , m 0 . (ii) The space V + JV is spanned by w m0−m * * , . . . , w m0 and w ′ m0−m * * , . . . , w ′ m0 . 
. . , m 0 − m * * + m * . Let w m0−m * * +m * +1 , ..., w m0 be a basis of V 2 . We define
. Based on them, as shown in Subsection D 3, we can choose independent vectors w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , . . . , w ′ m0 ∈ V 3 ⊂ F 2m0 q to satisfy the conditions w ′ i , Jw j = δ i,j and w ′ i , Jw ′ j = 0 for i, j = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , m 0 . The subspace V 4 is defined as the space spanned by w m0−m * * +1 , . . . , w m0 and w ′ m0−m * * +1 , . . . , w ′ m0 . Choosing a projection P V4 onto V 4 , we define the subspace V 5 := Ker P ⊤ V4 J. Since the dimension of the image of P ⊤ V4 J is 2m * * , that of V 5 is 2(m 0 − m * * ). Also, there is no cross term in J between V 4 and V 5 be-
Thus, the rank of P ⊤ V5 JP V5 is 2(m 0 − m * * ), where P V5 is a projection to V 5 . Hence, we choose 2(m 0 − m * * ) independent vectors w 1 , . . . , w m0−m * * ∈ V 5 and w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ m0−m * * ∈ V 5 such that w ′ i , Jw j = δ i,j and w i , Jw j = w ′ i , Jw ′ j = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , m 0 − m * * .
Since there is no cross term in J between V 4 and V 5 , the chosen vector w 1 , . . . , w m0 ∈ F 2m0 q and w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ m0 ∈ F 2m0 q satisfy the conditions w ′ i , Jw j = δ i,j and w i , Jw j = w ′ i , Jw ′ j = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , m 0 . Therefore, we can choose a symplectic matrix g * such that g * e i = w i and g * e m0+i = w ′ i for i = 1, . . . , m 0 because the vectors w i and w ′ i with i = 1, . . . , m 0 have the same symplectic structure as the vectors e 1 , . . . , e 2m0 .
Symplectic diagonalization
For the choice of w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , . . . , w ′ m0 , we prepare fundamental knowledge for symplectic diagonalization in the finite dimensional system. Assume that V is a finitedimensional vector space over a finite field F q . We consider a bilinear form Q from V × V to F q . Given an element v ∈ V , Q(v, ·) can be regarded as an element of the dual space V * of V. In this sense, Q can be regarded as a
Lemma 7. Assume that an anti-symmetric bilinear form Q is surjective, i.e., Ker Q is {0}. Then, the dimension of V is an even number 2k. There exists a basis
. . , k. Proof of Lemma 7: Such a basis can be chosen inductively. We choose a non-zero vector w 1 ∈ V. Since Q is surjective, we can choose another non-zero vector w ′ 1 ∈ V such that Q(w ′ 1 , w 1 ) = 1. Due to the assumption of induction, we have vectors w 1 , . . . , w l , w ′ 1 , . . . , w ′ l ∈ V such that Q(w ′ i , w j ) = δ i,j and Q(w i , w j ) = Q(w ′ i , w ′ j ) = 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , l. Then, we define the subspace V l := {v | Q(w 1 , v) = · · · = Q(w l , v) = Q(w ′ 1 , v) = · · · = Q(w ′ l , v) = 0}. Also, we define the subspace V ′ l spanned by w 1 , . . . , w l , w ′ 1 , . . . ,
We choose a non-zero vector w l+1 ∈ V l . Since Q is surjective, we can choose another non-zero vector v l+1 ∈ V such that Q(v l+1 , w l+1 ) = 1. Also, we have
Therefore, we obtain a desired basis. Using symplectic diagonalization, we show that we can choose independent vectors w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , . . . , w ′ m0 ∈ V 3 ⊂ F 2m0 q , inductively. First, we choose u m0−m * * +m * +1 to satisfy the condition u m0−m * * +m * +1 , Jw j = δ m0−m * * +m * +1,j for j = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , m 0 .
Based on the direct sum V 1 ⊕ V 3 = F 2m0 q , we decompose u m0−m * * +m * +1 = u ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 + w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 such that u ′ m0−m * * +m * +1
Since u ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , Jw j = 0, we have w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , Jw j = δ m0−m * * +m * +1,j for j = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , m 0 .
Next, from vectors w ′ m0−m * * +m * +1 , . . . , w ′ l ∈ V 3 ⊂ F 2m0 q , we choose u l+1 to satisfy the conditions
for j = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , m 0 and i = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , l. Based on the direct sum
For i ′ = m 0 − m * * + m * + 1, . . . , l, we have
The combination of (D1), (D2), and (D3), implies the relations w ′ l+1 , Jw j = δ l+1,j and w ′ l+1 , Jw ′ i ′ = 0. Notice that w ′ l+1 , Jw ′ l+1 = 0 holds since J is antisymmetric.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 5
Now, we show (2)⇒(1). Since the relations m 1 ≥ l 1 ≥ l 3 , m 1 ≥ l 2 ≥ l 3 are trivial, it is sufficient to show m 0 ≥ l 1 + l 2 − l 3 and l 3 ≥ 1. Since the matrix (V ′ ) ⊤V is not zero, we have l 3 ≥ 1. The relation m 0 ≥ l 1 + l 2 − l 3 follows from (8) and (10) . Thus, we obtain the relation (2)⇒(1). Now, we show (1)⇒ (2) . We assume that l 1 ≥ l 2 . Otherwise, we can exchange the computation basis and the Fourier basis. We chooseḡ m1 to be the identity matrix. For i = 1, . . . , m 1 , we chooseḡ i−1 to be A i−1 A −1 i , where the matrix A i is defined as follows.
A 0 is the identity matrix. For i = 1, . . . , l 3 , we define A i as the transposition between the 1-st entry and the i-th entry. For i = l 1 + 1, . . . , m 1 , we define A i as the identity matrix.
For i = 1, . . . , l 2 − l 3 , we define A l3+i in the following way. For the 1-st, l 3 + 2i − 1-th, and l 3 + 2i-th entries, it is defined as For i = 1, . . . , l 1 − l 2 , we define A l2+i in the following way. For the 1-st and 2l 2 −l 3 +i-th entries, it is defined as 1 0 1 1 . For other indices j, j ′ , the matrix component (A l2+i ) j,j ′ is defined as δ j,j ′ . Then, for i = 1, . . . , l 3 , we havev i =ē i . For i = 1, . . . , l 2 − l 3 , we havev l3+i =ē 1 +ē l3+2i−1 . For i = 1, . . . , l 1 − l 2 , we havev l2+i =ē 1 +ē 2l2−l3+i . For i = l 1 + 1, . . . , m 1 , we havev i =ē 1 .
The matrix [A l3+i ] F is characterized for i = 1, . . . , l 2 − l 3 as follows. For the 1-st, l 3 + 2i − 1-th, and l 3 + 2i-th entries, it is given as  
1 −1 0 0 1 0 −1 0 1   . For other indices j, j ′ , ([A l3+i ] F ) j,j ′ is given as δ j,j ′ .
The matrix [A l2+i ] F is characterized for i = 1, . . . , l 1 − l 2 as follows. For the 1-st and 2l 2 − l 3 + i-th entries, it is given as 1 −1 0 1 . For other indices j, j ′ , the matrix component ([A l2+i ] F ) j,j ′ is given as δ j,j ′ . Then, for i = 1, . . . , l 3 , we havev ′ i =ē i . For i = 1, . . . , l 2 − l 3 , we havev ′ l3+i =ē 1 +ē l3+2i . For i = 1, . . . , l 1 − l 2 , we havē v ′ l2+i =ē 1 . for i = l 1 + 1, . . . , m 1 , we havev ′ i =ē 1 . Therefore, we have rankV = l 1 and rankV ′ = l 2 .
Also, when j = 2, . . . , l 3 or j ′ = 2, . . . , l 3 , we have ((V ′ ) ⊤V ) j,j = δ j,j ′ . When j = 1, l 3 + 1, . . . , m 1 or j ′ = 1, l 3 + 1, . . . , m 1 , we have ((V ′ ) ⊤V ) j,j = 1. Hence, rank(V ′ ) ⊤V = l 3 . Thus, we obtain the relation (1)⇒(2).
